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It has been well-known at least since Partee (1984) that there is a systematic 
ambiguity associated with proportional adverbial quantifiers such as usually 
and mostly, and ever since Kadmon (1987) this ambiguity has been known 
as 'the proportion problem'. Most people who have studied the proportion 
problem have concentrated primarily on describing the range of truth con-
ditions associated with proportional sentences. Titls has turned out to be a 
delicate and complicated problem, and the issues it raises have by no means 
been settled in the literature yet. However, I would like to concentrate on a . 
slightly different aspect of the proportion problem. One of the peculiar things 
about proportional sentences is that one reading often seems to be strongly 
preferred and the other expected readings are either difficult or impossible 
to get. 1hls paper, then, sets out to explore the factors that constrain which 
of several construals of a proportional sentence will be available for a token 
uttered in a particular context. I will propose that there is a conventional im-
plicature associated with the use of a proportional adverbial quantifier, and 
that different proportional readings give rise to distinct presuppositions. On 
this view, sentences involving a proportional adverbial quantifier are indeed 
ambiguous across a number of distinct interpretations, but only some inter-
pretations will be felicitous on a given occasion of use. 
1. Truth conditions for proportional adverbial quantifiers 
In order to make the pragmatic analysis presented below explicit and con-
crete, it will be necessary to describe the truth conditions of proportional 
sentences with some precision. For the sake of simplicity, I will adopt a 
refinement of Lewis' (1975) so-called 'unselective binding' approach to ad-
verbial quantification; however, nothing crucial hinges on this choice. In 
particular, I see no obstacle to reconstructing the pragmatic analyses devel-
oped here in a dynamic framework (cf. the discussions of the proportion 
problem in e.g. de Swart (1991) or Chierchia (1992)). 
(1) a. Usually, if a woman owns a dog, she is happy. 
b. Usually, if an artist lives in a town, it is pretty. 
c. Usually, if a semanticist hears of a good job, she applies for it. 
The sentences in (1) all share certain structural similarities: an adverbial 
quantifier whose restriction is characterized by an if clause containing two 
indefinites and whose nuclear scope is characterized by the main clause. 
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However, the most natural interpretations of these sentences have non-
parallel truth conditions as suggested by the rough paraphrases in (2). 
(2) a. Most women who own at least one dog are happy. 
b. Most towns which contain at least one artist are pretty. 
c. Most semanticist/good-job hearings lead to applications. 
To adopt the descriptive terminology of Kadmon (1987), we can say that (la) 
involves asymmetric quantification over the first indefinite; (lb) involves 
asymmetric quantification over the second indefinite; and (le) involves sym-
metric quantification over both of the indefinites simultaneously. That is, we 
can distinguish the three readings in (1) by noting whether the quantifier 
"binds" the first indefinite, the second, or both. 
To do this, we will need to keep track of two kinds of variables, primed 
and unprimed. Therefore I will introduce the following notational conven-
tions: 
(3) E =a set of entities 
= {di,d2, ... ,ii,h, ... , s1,s2, ... ,wi, w2, .. . } 
N = a set of entity-denoting variables, primed and unprimed 
=No UN'= {x,y, .. . } U {x',y', .. . } 
F = a set of partial assignment functions from subsets of N into E 
= {f,Ja, fb, · · · ,g,ga,9b, · · .} 
This logical vocabulary allows translations of the sentences in (1) which are 
disambiguated in the relevant respect as given in (4). Intuitively, the primed 
variables will be those variables which are dominant in the quantification. 
(4) QUANTIFIER(RESTRICTION, NUCLEAR SCOPE) 
a. [usually]([woman(x') /\ dog(y) /\ owns(x', y)J, [happy(x')]) 
b. [usually]([artist(x) /\ town(y') /\ lives-in(x, y')] , [pretty(y')]) 
c. [usually]([semanticist( x') /\ good-job(y') /\ hears-of(x' , y')], 
[applies-for(x', y')]) 
Note that I have given translations of the restrictions and the nuclear scopes 
in (9) as formulas containing free variables in the style of Heim's (1982: 
chapter II) elaboration of Lewis' basic approach. Unselective binding is no-
toriously inadequate for distinguishing proportional readings. But as pointed 
out in Root (1985) and elsewhere, this deficiency can be easily remedied 
by replacing Lewis' original conception of a quantificational case as corre-
sponding to an individual assignment function with the notion of an equiva-
lence class of assignment functions: 
(5) Inducing a partition on the set of assignment functions: 
1\vo assignment functions f and g are members of the same 
equivalence class (i.e. the same quantificational CASE) 
iff they agree on what they assign to all primed variables: 
(CLASS(!)= CLASS(g)] :=Va E N'[f(cx) = g(cx) 
or f and g are both undefined for ex] 
To see how this works, consider the partial assignment functions specified 
in (6). 
(6) a. fa={(x' ,w1), (y, d1)} 
b. fb = {(x',w1),(y,d2)} 
C. fc = {(x',w1),(y,d3)} 
d. fd = {(x',w2),(y,d4)} 
e. J. = { (x', w2), (y, ds)} 
Since we will be needing to examine many sets of assignment functions in 
what follows, it will be more convenient to convey the information displayed 
in (6) as presented in the table in (7). 
(7) x' y 
a. W1 di 
b. W1 dz 
c. W1 d3 
d. W2 d4 
e. W2 ds 
The assignment functions given in (a), (b), and (c) are members of the same 
equivalence class, since they all assign the one primed variable to the same 
entity, namely, w1 • Similarly, the assignment functions specified in (d) and 
(e) constitute a second equivalence class. 
The truth conditions of adverbial quantifiers, then, will depend on 
equivalence classes of assignment functions, rather than directly on individ-
ual assignment functions. In particular, the truth conditions of usually are 
given in (8). 
(8) [usually](¢, 1jJ) is true iff more than half of the equivalence classes 
which contain an assignment function verifying ¢ 
also contain an assignment function verifying [ ¢ /\ 1jJ]. 
Two examples will illustrate how these rules predict a truth value for a 
sentence construed under a particular proportional reading when evaluated 
against a specific set of facts. 
(9) Usually, if a woman owns a dog, she is happy. 
We have seen that (9) favors a woman-dominant asymmetric reading, so we 
prime the woman variable but not the dog variable in the translations of the 
restriction <f> and the nuclear scope ,,P: 
(10) a. <f> = [woman(x') /\ dog(y) /\ owns(x', y)] 
b. 'ljJ = [happy(x')] 
Now consider the facts reported in (11). 
(11) x' y verifies¢>? verifies [ </> /\ ,,P]? 
a. Wi di yes yes 
b. W2 d2 yes yes 
c. W3 d3 yes no 
d. W3 d4 yes no 
e. W3 ds yes no 
Since x' is the only primed variable, we have three quantificational cases, 
one for each woman. The third case, the one corresponding to woman w3, 
contains three distinct assignment functions, one for each dog she owns. The 
first two cases verify the nuclear scope as well as the restriction, so they con-
firm the generalization expressed by (9); the third case, however, contains no 
assignment function which simultaneously verifies both the restriction and 
the nuclear scope. Nevertheless, two out of three cases confirm the gener-
alization, and the sentence is correctly predicted to be true in this situation 
under the specified reading. 
(12) Usually, if a woman owns a donkey, she deducts it from her taxes. 
This sentence favors a symmetric interpretation, so we prime both variables: 
(13) a. <f> = [woman(x') /\ donkey(y') /\ owns(x', y')] 
b. t/; = [deducts(x',y')] 
(14) x' y' verifies¢>? verifies [</> /\ ,,P]? 
a. Wi di yes yes 
b. W2 d2 yes yes 
c. W3 d3 yes no 
d. W3 d4 yes no 
e. W3 ds yes no 
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Here we have women owning donkeys instead of dogs, but the pattern of 
facts is exactly the same as for the previous example, as can be seen by 
comparing the last column of (14) with that of (11). The difference here 
is that both variables are primed, so that two assignment functions will be 
members of the same case only if they agree both on what they assign to the 
woman variable and to the donkey variable. This means in effect that each 
assignment function constitutes a separate case. The result is that now only 
two out of five cases confirm the generalization, so the sentence is predicted 
false in this situation on the symmetric reading. Thus the same pattern of 
facts can either verify or falsify a proportional sentence, depending on which 
proportional reading it is construed under, i.e., depending on which variables 
get primed. 
We can now restate the central problem addressed by this paper as . 
follows: what are the structural or pragmatic factors which predict whether 
or not a variable can be primed? 
2. Presuppositions for proportional adverbial quantifiers 
The analysis I would like to develop depends on the hypothesis stated infor-
mally as follows: a variable will be primed only if the value of that variable 
potentially can determine the value of the nuclear scope independently of the 
values of the other variables. That is, it will be appropriate to use a primed 
variable only if that variable can at least potentially affect the outcome of 
the evaluation of the instance of quantification-there must be some corre-
lation, causal or otherwise, between the identity of the primed variable and 
the value of the nuclear scope. 
This hypothesis explains why (15) favors a symmetric interpretation 
when evaluated against facts like those in (17). 
(15) Usually, if a semanticist hears of a good job, she applies for it. 
(16) a. </> = [semanticist(x') /\ good-job(y') /\ hears-of(x', y')] 
b. 'I/; = [applies-for(x', y')] 
(17) x' y' verifies ¢>? verifies [</> /\ .,P]? 
a. sI JI yes yes 
b. sI J2 yes no 
c. s2 JI yes no 
d. s2 12 yes yes 
e. s2 J3 yes yes 
Considering first assignment functions fa and fb, we see that semanticist s1 
applies for one job but not the other, so the value of the nuclear scope clearly 
depends on the identity of the job variable; hence, the job variable must be 
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primed. Similarly, assignment functions fa and fc show that one semanticist 
applies for job )1, but the other semanticist does not, so the semanticist vari-
able must also be primed. This suggests that (15) should prefer a symmetric 
interpretation, which agrees with intuitions. 
We can characterize the proposed connection between primed vari-
ables and the context by means of the formal condition defined in (18). 
(18) Homogeneity: 
A use of a proportional quantifier with restriction <P and nuclear 
scope 'ljJ satisfies the HOMOGENEITY CONDITION iff any pair 
of assignment functions f and g such that 
a. f and g verify the restriction <P and 
b. f and g are members of the same case 
also satisfy the following: 
c. [t/J]' = [t/J]9 
This criterion boils down to the requirement that either all members of a 
quantificational case must agree on verifying the nuclear scope, or they all 
must falsify it. 
The homogeneity criterion leads to predictions concerning the avail-
ability of proportional readings in specific contexts under the assumption 
stated in (19). 
(19) Homogeneity Presupposition: 
A use of a proportional adverbial quantifier when construed 
under a particular proportional reading is felicitous only in 
a context which is consistent with the homogeneity condition. 
In other words, I am suggesting that the use of a proportional adverbial quan-
tifier presupposes that the homogeneity condition is satisfied. Since different 
proportional readings give rise to distinct homogeneity presuppositions, only 
some readings will be consistent with a given context.1 
1 Note that (19) as stated applies only to adverbial quantifiers. It may 
turn out that nominal quantifiers do not give rise to homogeneity presuppo-
sitions; this would be natural enough, given that proportional nominal quan-
tifiers also do not give rise to distinct sets of truth conditions in the way that 
adverbial quantifiers can. The issues involved are complex, and a thorough 
evaluation would take us far away from the main purpose of this paper, which 
is to seek an explanation for the observed preferences for one proportional 
reading over another. Therefore I will leave this question for another time, 
though see Barker (1993) for some relevant discussion. 
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Thus the homogeneity presuppositions for the preferred readings of 
the basic examples in (1) are: that a woman is happy with respect to all of her 
dogs, or to none of them; that a town is pretty or not no matter which artists 
live in it; but that whether a semanticist applies for a job or not depends both 
on the identity of the semanticist and on the identity of the job in question. 
These assumptions are all relatively natural, which shows that the preferred 
readings of these sentences are at least consistent with the homogeneity hy-
pothesis. The remaining sections develop the empirical predictions of the 
hypothesis in more interesting cases. 
3. The donkey pronoun rule 
There have been a number of suggestions in the literature for predicting the 
availability of proportional readings. Baeurle and Egli (1985) propose the · 
rule of thumb given in (20). 
(20) Baeurle and Egli (1985): The donkey pronoun rule 
A variable is more likely to be primed if there is a donkey pronoun 
in the nuclear scope which translates as that variable. 
Note that this criterion depends only on structural properties of a sentence, 
and does not consider context at all. This generalization makes good predic-
tions in many cases, including the examples given in (1) and repeated here: 
(21) a. Usually, if a woman owns a dog, she is happy. 
b. Usually, if an artist lives in a town, it is pretty. 
c. Usually, if a semanticist hears of a good job, she applies for it. 
Exactly those indefinites in the restriction which give rise to primed variables 
(under the preferred reading as described above) also serve as the antecedent 
of a donkey pronoun in the nuclear scope. 
However, despite its success with some examples, the donkey pronoun 
rule sometimes makes exactly the wrong prediction. 
(22) Usually, if a story pleases a child, it must be read over and over. 
Here the only donkey pronoun in the nuclear scope takes the story indefinite 
as its antecedent. We would naturally expect, therefore, that this sentence 
should prefer a story-dominant asymmetric reading. But such a reading 
would predict that this sentence could be truly asserted even if most situ-
ations in which a story pleases a child do not result in repeated readings, 
so long as the single readings are distributed over a minority of the child-
pleasing stories. Judging from informants, this seems to be a highly unlikely 
reading for (22). On the homogeneity hypothesis, this fact is explained by 
observing that such a reading would presuppose that a given story will either 
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be read repeatedly to every child it pleases or to none of them. In a neu-
tral context, it is more plausible to assume that whether a story is repeated 
depends on the identity of the child involved as well as on the story. 
In addition to (22), many of the examples in the remainder of the paper 
will also be cases in which the donkey pronoun rule makes inappropriate 
predictions. 
Furthermore, note that if a nuclear scope happens not to contain a don-
key pronoun, then the donkey pronoun rule fails to make any prediction at all. 
Nevertheless, such sentences seem just as likely to prefer one proportional 
reading over another. 
(23) Usually, if a man opens an umbrella, it is raining. 
There are no donkey pronouns in this sentence. The symmetric reading 
seems to be the preferred interpretation, and a man-dominant asymmetric 
reading may also be possible. In any case, an umbrella-dominant asymmet-
ric reading is out of the question. That is, (23) cannot normally be interpreted 
as asserting that most umbrellas have the property that they are only opened 
when it is raining. Such a reading would be predicted to be satisfied even if 
the majority of men compulsively opened umbrellas on sunny days over and 
over again, so long as only a minority of umbrellas were involved. 
The absence of an umbrella-dominant asymmetric reading is exactly 
what the homogeneity hypothesis would predict. Such a reading would pre-
suppose that some umbrellas would always be opened only in the rain, while 
other umbrellas would always be opened only when it is not raining, no mat-
ter who is carrying them. Since this is not a very plausible assumption in a 
neutral context, the homogeneity hypothesis predicts that (23) will not nor-
mally have such a reading. 
But why is the donkey pronoun rule so often correct? Obviously, the 
presence of a donkey pronoun in the nuclear scope makes it more likely that 
the variable associated with that pronoun will have a strong effect on the truth 
conditions of the nuclear scope. That is, if the nuclear scope of the sentence 
Usually, if a woman owns a dog, she is happy amounts to the proposition 
that x is happy, where x is the woman variable, then it is no wonder that 
this variable turns out to have a strong effect on whether the nuclear scope 
is satisfied or not. 
Thus the homogeneity hypothesis is capable of explaining the insight 
embodied in the donkey pronoun rule while still being capable of making 
correct predictions in situations in which the donkey pronoun rule gives in-
correct predictions or fails to make any predictions at all. 
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4. Uniqueness presuppositions 
Kadmon (1987, 1990) suggests that proportional readings can give rise to 
distinct presuppositions under certain conditions. The presuppositions she 
has in mind involve implications of uniqueness or relative uniqueness. 
(24) a. Usually, if a semanticist hears of a good job, she applies for it. 
b. Usually, if a woman owns a dog, she talks to it. 
As we have seen, the sentence in (24a) favors a symmetric interpretation, 
and Kadmon notes that there are no uniqueness implications for either of the 
variables involved. That is, (24a) can be felicitously uttered in a context in 
which each semanticist hears of more than one job (the referent of the job 
variable is not unique relative to the choice of semanticist), and in which 
more than one semanticist hears of each job (the referent of the semanticist · 
variable is not necessarily unique relative to the choice of job). In contrast, 
(24b) favors a woman-dominant asymmetric reading, and Kadmon claims 
that there is a uniqueness implication, and that (24b) will be felicitous only 
under the assumption that there is a unique dog per woman. 
In general, Kadmon (1990:301) asserts that symmetric readings never 
give rise to any uniqueness presuppositions, but asymmetric readings can: if 
the referent of an unprimed variable is referred to by a definite NP such as 
a donkey pronoun, then, as a result of the definiteness associated with that 
NP, the referent of the variable must be unique relative to the choice of the 
primed variables (see Kadmon (1990:310)). 
However, as noted by Kadmon, there are important exceptions to this 
claim, including Heim's famous sage plant sentence, a variant of which ap-
pears in (25). 
(25) Usually, if a woman buys a sage plant here, she buys two others 
along with it. 
Clearly (25) strongly prefers a woman-dominant asymmetric reading, so that 
the presence of the donkey pronoun it should give rise to the presupposition 
that the referent of the sage plant variable is unique relative to the choice 
of a woman. However, there is no implication that any of the sage plants is 
distinguished in any way from the others. 
Kadmon (1990:317) offers the following rationale: if it can't possibly 
matter which sage plant we pick, then the non-primed variable is excused 
from uniqueness presuppositions. 
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(26) x' y x' buys two others along with y? 
a. W1 S1 yes 
b. W1 S2 yes 
c. W1 S3 yes 
d. W2 S4 yes 
e. W2 S5 yes 
f. W2 86 yes 
g. W3 S7 no 
h. W3 Sg no 
i. W4 S9 no 
j. W5 S10 no 
That is, as can be seen by inspecting (26), for any choice of a woman, it 
doesn't matter which sage plant we pick as the referent of the pronoun: either 
is is true of all of them that two others were bought along with them, or or 
none of them. 
Note that Kadmon's requirement is logically equivalent to the homo-
geneity presupposition for the relevant proportional reading, and furthermore 
that the meaning of the sage plant sentence entails homogeneity. However, 
there are examples similar to sage plant sentences but in which homogeneity 
is contingent on the context. 
(27) Usually, if a person knows a symphony well, she can't help 
humming along with it when she hears it on the radio. 
Clearly, this sentence has an asymmetric reading on which it can't be falsified 
by the existence of a single woman who knows dozens of symphonies but 
never hums. Therefore, thanks to the definiteness of the donkey pronouns in 
the nuclear scope, Kadmon predicts that there should be a unique symphony 
per person. However, a use of (27) does not presuppose that the relevant 
people know at most one symphony, or that people who know more than one 
symphony somehow fall outside the scope of the asserted generalization. 
It is not clear that Kadmon's sage plant exception applies in this situ-
ation, since it is perfectly possible to imagine that a person will always hum 
along with the theme to Beetovan's 9th symphony, but never with that of 
the 7th. Thus it 'matters' which symphony we have in mind. However, we 
could invoke the sage-plant exception if we first assume the homogeneity 
hypothesis, which predicts that specified reading is felicitous only under the 
assumption that each woman either hums along with all of the symphonies 
she knows or none of them. 
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As far as I know, the homogeneity hypothesis is consistent with Kad-
mon 's claims about the uniqueness presuppositions associated with propor-
tional readings, and in fact, as we have just seen, homogeneity may be cru-
cially involved in order for Kadmon's theory to make the correct prediction 
for certain examples such as (27). It is worth noting that sage plant sen-
tences, far from being systematic exceptions to the general theory, as they 
are for Kadmon, are prototypical examples confirming the predictions of the 
homogeneity hypothesis. 
In any case, Kadmon's theory without elaboration cannot provide a 
complete theory of the availability of proportional readings in context, as 
shown by (27). Furthermore, just as for the donkey pronoun rule discussed 
in the previous section, Kadmon's theory fails to make any predictions at 
all in the absence of donkey pronouns or definite descriptions in the nuclear . 
scope. Therefore the homogeneity hypothesis is motivated independently of 
Kadmon's theory. 
5. Explicit and implicit focus structures 
Kadmon (1987), Heim (1990), and others have observed that focus seems to 
affect the availability of proportional readings. 
(28) a. Usually, if a drummer lives in an apartment building, 
it is half empty. 
b. Usually, if a drummer lives in an APARTMENT BUILDING, 
it is half empty. 
For instance, the sentence in (28a) normally prefers an object-dominant 
asymmetric reading. Thus a single full apartment building which houses 
most of the drummers is not sufficient to falsify (28a). However, if the 
apartment building description receives contrastive stress, as in (28b), then 
a drummer-dominant asymmetric reading or a symmetric reading becomes 
more prominent. For these readings, it is the housing preferences of individ-
ual drummers that we are concerned with, and if a number of drummers live 
in the same apartment building, they can each constitute a separate coun-
terexample to the generalization expressed by the quantificational token, so 
that a single apartment building full of drummers can falsify (28b ). 
Contrasts like the one in (28) suggest the descriptive generalization in 
(29). 
(29) Variables in focus don't get primed. 
Krifka (1992) proposes a mechanism which accounts for this generalization. 
As part of a general theory of the interaction of focus with quantification, he 
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proposes that if clauses must routinely be factored into a focus and a quan-
tificational background. In effect, his framework guarantees that variables in 
focus undergo existential quantification, and variables in the quantificational 
background are bound by the quantifier, giving truth conditions, which, as 
near as I can tell, are compatible with the ones given here. Thus Krifka sug-
gest that predicting which variables are primed is just a special case of the 
more general problem of deciding which NPs are in semantic focus. 
One difficulty with evaluating this hypothesis is that it is not always 
easy to tell which elements of a sentence are in focus, especially in the 
absence of any marked degree of intonational stress. However, following 
Krifka, we can assume that if an NP does receive contrastive intonational 
stress, then either it or some constituent containing it is in focus. Our strat-
egy for testing (29), then, will be to look for situations in which a description 
receives contrastive stress but which nevertheless must be primed. 
To further develop the drnmmer example, imagine that we are talking 
about the housing preferences of musicians. Most musicians usually prefer 
to live in isolated houses so that they can practice late at night without dis-
turbing their neighbors. Therefore, if a musician lives in an apartment build-
ing instead, there must be some overriding advantage. For instance, perhaps 
cello players, bassoon players, and tuba players will live in an apartment 
building if it is sufficiently close to the conservatory practice rooms, since 
that means they won't have to carry their heavy instruments as far. In this 
context, consider a token of (30). 
(30) Usually, if a DRUMMER lives in an apartment building, 
it is close to the bars downtown. 
It seem to me that in this context, (30) can have a drummer-dominant asym-
metric reading (and perhaps also a symmetric reading). To see this, note that 
(30) has a reading which can be verified merely if most of the drummers live 
in a single large apartment building downtown, even if a smaller number of 
drummers live in multiple apartment buildings closer to the conservatory. 
Such truth conditions result only when the drummer variable is primed. 
Note also that the availability of such a reading is consistent with the 
homogeneity hypothesis, which requires that for any given drummer, when 
she chooses to live in an apartment building, she will either always choose 
one that is downtown, or she never will, which is a plausible assumption in 
the specified context. 
A similar type of example is discussed in some detail in Kratzer 
(1989b): 
(31) If a SICILIAN adores a piece of music, it is rarely a Bellini opera. 
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Kratzer observes that a piece-of-music asymmetric reading is completely im-
possible. That is, there is no reading of (31) which depends only on the num-
ber of Sicilian-liked pieces of music which happen to be Bellini operas. If 
there were, (33) could still be true even if there were thousands of Sicilians 
who adored Bellini operas, so long as there were a few Sicilians who like 
enough Mozart and Verdi operas to outnumber Bellini's oeuvre. 
The existence of examples like (30) and (31) motivates the observation 
stated in (32). 
(32) Sometimes an indefinite which receives contrastive stress 
gives rise to a variable which must be primed. 
On the face of it, this fact at least calls into question the assumption that 
being in focus is incompatible with translating as a primed variable. 
How serious of a problem is this for a focus-based theory of propor-
tional ambiguity? There may be a way out. Krifka (1992, p.c.) makes the 
point that there may be more than one focus structure involved in such ex-
amples. There may be one focus structure for the if clause, and a second 
focus structure for an implicit discourse-level focus operator associated with 
the sentence as a whole. In such cases of embedded focus, sentence accent 
aligns with the highest operator. It is possible, then, that the contrastive stress 
on drummer in (30) only reflects the fact that the drummer description is fo-
cussed at the level of the sentence as a whole, at the same time that that the 
drummer indefinite is not in focus with respect to the local if clause. If so, 
then Krifka 's theory at least doesn't make any wrong predictions with respect 
to these examples. 
An embedded-focus story may turn out to be correct for these exam-
ples. If so, where does this leave us? To the extent that surface marking 
underdetermines the focus structure hypothesized by Krifka's theory, we are 
still faced with situations in which we have no explanation for why some 
variables can be in focus and some cannot be. To the extent that the homo-
geneity hypothesis is capable of making good predictions in such cases, it is 
motivated independently of the semantics of focus. 
6. Weak readings and domain narrowing 
One potential threat to the generality of the homogeneity hypothesis comes 
from the so-called weak versus strong interpretations for some quantifica-
tional sentences as discussed by Heim (1982:61-2), Schubert and Pelletier 
(1989), Gawron, Nerbonne and Peters (1992), and Chierchia (1992), among 
others. 
(33) Usually, if a man has a quarter in his pocket, he puts it in the meter. 
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The sentence in (33) favors an asymmetric reading on which there is one 
case per man. Thus the homogeneity thesis would seem to predict that a use 
of (33) on this reading will presuppose that each man will either put all or 
none of his quarters in the meter. But a use of (33) seems to be perfectly 
felicitous in a context in which each man puts only as many quarters in the 
meter as he needs to: some quarters go into the meter, and some will remain 
in the man's pocket. Aie homogeneity presuppositions somehow suspended 
for this example? 
Gawron, Nerbonne and Peters (1991) and Chierchia (1992) suggest 
that strong readings arise from the presence of E-type pronouns. In essence, 
they restrict Kadmon 's explanation for the failure of uniqueness for donkey 
pronouns in sage-plant examples so as to apply specifically to pronouns with 
E-type denotations: a use of an E-type pronoun will be felicitous in a context 
in which multiple entities satisfy the implicit descriptive content of the pro-
noun only if the choice of such an entity is immaterial to the outcome of the 
quantification. I see two empirical problems with this strategy. First, strong 
readings seem to be possible even without the presence of E-type pronouns. 
(34) a. Usually, if a man saw a truck coming, he got out of the way. 
b. Most men who saw a truck coming got out of the way. 
Both sentences in (34) entail that each man confirming the generalization got 
out of the way of all of the trucks he saw coming. 
The second problem is that this account makes incorrect predictions 
in other contexts arguably involving E-type pronouns, such as paycheck sen-
tences. 
(35) a. The man who sent his grandmother to a nursing home 
was kinder than the man who threw her out on the street. 
b. The woman who put her hand on the fridge was luckier 
than the woman who put it on the stove. 
If the paycheck pronouns her and it are indeed E-type pronouns, then we 
should expect that (35a) presupposes that the second man threw both of his 
grandmothers out on the street, and that (35b) presupposes that the second 
woman put both of her hands on the stove. But these sentences give rise to 
no such presuppositions. 
I would like to suggest instead that weak readings are just a special 
case of the independently motivated mechanism of domain narrowing. Once 
contextual domain narrowing is taken into account, examples such as (33) 
can be seen to behave exactly as expected and require no weakening of the 
homogeneity hypothesis. 
For nominal quantification, domain narrowing explains why, for ex-
ample, a universal quantifier such as every can be true in the face of apparent 
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counterexamples. Thus the reason that Every tree is laden with wonderful 
apples is not almost invariably false is that it can be understood as if it ap-
plied only to the trees within the bounds of a certain contextually salient 
orchard (see Kratzer (1989a) or Roberts (to appear)). For nominal quantifi-
cation, then, domain narrowing allows for quantification over a contextually 
restricted set of individuals. But adverbial quantifiers do not quantify over 
individuals; roughly speaking, they quantify over situations (or partial situa-
tions), as approximated in this paper as partial assignment functions. There-
fore domain narrowing for adverbial quantification would involve quantifi-
cation over a restricted set of assignment functions. 
In order to see which assignment functions are indeed relevant for the 
parking situation, we must be more explicit about the assumptions implicit 
in the context. Do we need to consider every situation involving a man and a 
parking meter? Clearly not. A number of ancillary propositions must hold: · 
the man must have just parked his car in front of the parking meter in ques-
tion, it must be the law of the land that during certain hours of the day the 
meter must be fed, the man must be aware of these laws, the meter in ques-
tion must not have time left on it from the last driver, and so on. Basically, 
a parking situation will be relevant for deciding the truth of (33) only if it is 
also a situation in which the meter needs to be fed. 
Now consider a specific context in which homogeneity seems to be 
violated. 
(36) x' y x' put y in the meter? 
a. m1 q1 yes 
b. m1 q2 no 
c. m1 q3 no 
d. m2 q4 yes 
e. m2 qs yes 
In (36), man m1 puts quarter q1 into the meter, and leaves quarters q2 and 
q3 in his pocket. The assignment functions in (36b) and (36c), then, are 
the ones which seem to violate homogeneity. However, these assignment 
functions are not relevant for deciding the truth of (33), since they correspond 
to situations in which the man has already put a quarter into the machine. 
They are no more relevant than situations in which, say, the meter is broken, 
or in which it is the middle of the night (when parking laws don't apply). 
Once we restrict the domain of quantification to exclude such assignment 
functions, the resulting set of assignment functions satisfies homogeneity. 
One particularly striking way to see the importance of the contextually 
supplied implicit assumptions that this explanation relies on is to see what 
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happens when the supposedly crucial assumption is not present. Imagine 
that we are talking instead about the habits of gamblers. 
(37) Usually, if a man has a quarter in his pocket, he puts it in the slot. 
In this situation, the implicit assumptions are roughly parallel, except that 
there is no longer any assumption that the slot machine will change state (in 
any relevant way) after the insertion of each quarter. Therefore a situation 
in which a man has just put a quarter into the slot of a slot machine is just 
as much an opportunity to gamble as before. Thus we correctly predict that 
(37) does not seem to have a so-called weak interpretation parallel to that 
alleged for (33). That is, (37) cannot be verified merely if each man puts a 
single quarter in the slot machine. Here all of the assignment functions in 
(36) are equally relevant, and the force of the homogeneity presupposition 
comes through exactly as predicted. 
Summary 
We have seen that a sentence involving a proportional adverbial quantifier is 
ambiguous across a number ofreadings which have distinct truth conditions. 
These readings are characterized by the status of the indefinites in the restric-
tion of the quantifier, i.e., whether or not they translate as primed variables. 
However, only some readings will be felicitous in a given context. More 
specifically, the context must be consistent with the homogeneity presuppo-
sition induced by the reading in question, which requires that all members 
of a case must agree on whether they satisfy the nuclear scope. This homo-
geneity hypothesis explains why the distribution of donkey pronouns in the 
nuclear scope is such a good indicator of the preferred proportional reading 
in general, but it also makes correct predictions where the donkey-pronoun 
rule makes incorrect predictions. The homogeneity hypothesis is also con-
sistent with the relevant predictions of Kadmon's theory of uniqueness pre-
suppositions for asymmetric quantification. In particular, sage plant contexts 
are prototypical examples of situations which satisfy the homogeneity crite-
rion. Furthermore, the homogeneity hypothesis makes good predictions in 
some situations in which neither the donkey-pronoun theory nor Kadmon's 
uniqueness theory make any predictions at all, namely, sentences in which 
the nuclear scope does not contain any donkey pronouns (or other definite 
descriptions that denote one of the variables introduced by the restriction). 
The homogeneity hypothesis is also consistent with Krifka's theory of the 
connection between focus structure and semantic interpretation, and it makes 
good predictions in situations in which the relevant details of the focus struc-
ture are at best underdetermined. 
17 
References 
Barker, Chris (1993) 'U nselecti ve Determiners', to appear in the proceedings 
of WCCFL XII. 
Baeuerle, R. and U. Egli (1985) 'Anapher, Nominalphrase und Eselssaetze', 
Papier 105 des Sonderforschungsbereichs 99, Universitaet Konstanz. 
Chierchia, Gennaro (1992) 'Anaphora and Dynamic Binding', Linguistics 
and Philosophy 15.2: 111-183. 
Gawron, Jean Mark, John Nerbonne, and Stanley Peters (1991) 'The ab-
sorption principle and E-type anaphora', in Jon Barwise et al. (eds.), 
Situation Theory and Its Applications, volume 2, Center for the Study 
of Language and Information, Stanford. 
Heim, Irene (1982) The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases, . 
dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
Heim, Irene (1990) 'E-Type Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora', Linguistics 
and Philosophy 13: 137-177. 
Kadmon, Nirit (1987) On Unique and Non-unique Reference and Asym-
metric Quantification, PhD dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst. 
Kadmon, Nirit (1990) 'Uniqueness', Linguistics and Philosophy 13:273-
324. 
Kratzer, Angelika (1989a) 'An Investigation of the Lumps of Thought', Lin-
guistics and Philosophy 12.5:607-653. 
Kratzer, Angelika (1989b) 'Stage-level and individual level predicates', ms., 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
Kriflca, Manfred (1992) 'A framework for focus-sensitive quantification', 
in C. Barker and D. Dowty (eds.) Proceedings of the Second Con-
ference on Semantics and Linguistic Theory, Ohio State University 
Working Papers in Linguistics volume 40, Department of Linguistics, 
Ohio State University, Columbus, 215-236. 
Lewis, David (1975) 'Adverbs of Quantification', inE. Keenan, ed., Formal 
Semantics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Partee, Barbara (1984) 'Nominal and temporal anaphora', Linguistics and 
Philosophy 7: 243-286. 
Roberts, Craige (to appear) 'Domain selection in dynamic semantics', in Em-
mon Bach, Eloise Jelinek, Angelika Kratzer, and Barbara H. Partee 
(eds.), Cross-Linguistic Quantification, Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
Root, R. (1985) The Semantics of Anaphora in Discourse, PhD dissertation, 
University of Texas, Austin. 
Schubert, Lenhart K. and Francis Jeffrey Pelletier (1989) 'Generically speak-
ing', in Gennaro Chierchia, Barbara H. Partee and Raymond Turner 
18 
(eds.), Properties, Types and Meaning, volume II: Semantic Issues, 
193-268. 
de Swart, H. (1991) Adverbs of Quantification: a Generalized Quantifier 
Approach, PhD dissertation, Groningen. 
Chris Barker 
Center for Cognitive Science 
208 Ohio Stadium East 
1961 Tuttle Park Place 
Columbus, OH 43210 
barker@ling.ohio-state.edu 
